This note constructs an efficient mechanism for finding the best candidate for a committee from a sequence of potential candidates. Committee members have independent private values information about the quality of the candidate. The mechanism selects the best candidate according to the standard utilitarian welfare criterion. Furthermore, the mechanism can be modified to have a balanced budget.
Introduction
A recent paper by Albrecht, Anderson & Vroman (2010) investigated equilibria in models of search by committees. As is natural for many committees, that paper does not allow side payments to be made during the search process. Nevertheless the committee members have often other trade-offs even if outright monetary transfers are not allowed. Consider the example of an academic job applicant. Different research groups may derive different payoffs from hiring the candidate. Often there are other decisions within the department that can be adjusted to compensate a given group. At the very least, the department is also likely to hire in coming years. It is possible to provide some incentives for the committee members by linking current decisions to future ones.
Motivated by considerations of this type, we make the opposite assumption in this note. We assume that utility is perfectly transferable between the committee members. In other words, we assume that the preferences of the committee members are quasilinear in transfers, and we adopt a mechanism design approach to the committee decisions. It seems natural to require that the budget be balanced in the committee. In other words, the members cannot get outside financial help to resolve their conflict and they do not burn money.
The dynamic pivot mechanism defined in Bergemann & Välimäki (2010) can be used in the current setting to support the efficient choice of a candidate. The transfers required to implement this mechanism are easily computed. In fact, these computations are much easier than the equilibrium computations in the model without transfers. The committee decision problem has similarities to a public goods provision problem. The chosen candidate will have an effect on the welfare of all committee members. The opportunity cost of not continuing the search can be thought of as the cost of the chosen candidate. Nevertheless, this cost is just an opportunity cost and therefore not reflected when balancing the budget. Hence in contrast to the problem of providing a public good with a real production cost, we show that the dynamic pivot mechanism generates a surplus. By usual arguments, this surplus can be rebated to the committee members in a manner that balances the budget.
The insights in this note suggest that even if the committees cannot use transfers, search can be conducted more effectively than by using simple voting rules. In more finely tuned deliberations, trade-offs between committee members' preferences are possible. This can be done e.g. by putting less weight in future deliberations on the opinions of the committee members that are blocking the selection of the current candidate.
In Section 2, we describe the model. In Section 3, we define the dynamic pivot mechanism for this setting and show that an efficient mechanism with a balanced budget exists. In Section 4, we discuss some extensions of the result.
Model

Uncertainty and Payoffs
A committee consisting of N symmetric members i ∈ {1, ...N } must choose one alternative from a countable sequence of candidates indexed by their time of appearance t = 0, 1, ... All committee members discount future with the same discount factor δ. A candidate t yields a payoff x i t ∈ R to committee member i if t is selected. Following Albrecht, Anderson & Vroman (2010) , we assume that the x i t are i.i.d. across the i and t and that they are distributed according to a distribution function F. Denote the sum of payoffs amongst the committee members by
By independence, z has distribution G N (·) that can be readily computed by the convolution formula. The sum of the payoffs of all committee members except i is denoted by z −i and again by independence, this random variable
We denote the realization of of the vector of payoffs in period t by x t and the sequence of such vectors by
..) where d t = 1 indicates that candidate t was selected. Since only one candidate can be chosen, we have
Given the linear structure of payoffs, it is without loss of generality to consider only deterministic allocations. The committee members can also be asked to make transfers in each period t. Let p = (p 
where the expectation is taken over the realizations x i t . Social welfare in the model is defined by the utilitarian welfare criterion on the committee members ignoring the transfers for the moment.
Direct Mechanism
Each x i t is observed only by committee member i. We construct a direct revelation mechanism where each committee member reports in each period her payoff x i t from this candidate. We denote these reports by r i t . The hiring decisions d t ∈ {0, 1} must be decided based on the vector of reports r t rather than on the true payoffs x t .
In order to give the committee members incentives to report truthfully, i.e. to choose r i t = x i t , we assume that they can be asked to make or receive transfers p i t based on the vector of realized reports. We denote the profile of reports in period t by r t and we let r = (r 0 , r 1 , ...).
A public history in period t is a sequence of decisions and reports in the past periods, h t := (r 0 , d 0 , r 1 , d 1 , . .., r t−1 , d t−1 ). Each player i also knows her own past realized types h
. A reporting strategy of player i is a sequence of functions
Following (Bergemann & Välimäki 2010) , a direct dynamic mechanism is a pair of functions (d t (r t ; t t ) , p t (r t ; h t )) . The mechanism is ex-post incentive compatible if for all i, all t, and all
Notice that here we are assuming that committee members other than i report truthfully. By the one-shot deviation principle, it is sufficient to check the incentives in period t only for player i. Notice also that in this ex post criterion, all the values of the x i t are assumed to be known up to t, but expectations are taken over these variables for s > t.
The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism
In order to compute the dynamic pivot mechanism we need to solve two social welfare maximization problems for the case of complete information.
, and let d
It is a standard exercise in search theory to show that the optimal decision rule for each of these cases is described by a cutoff policy that requires hiring the first candidate for whom z t ≥ z * k , where k is the number of players, and
Denote the optimal values by obtained using the optimal cutoff strategies after history h t and at current type profile x t by W (x t ; h t ) and
.
1
The marginal contribution of player i is
The transfers are flow variables in the sense that they are paid each period and the quantities on the right hand side are stock variables reflecting the players' payoffs in the dynamic game. Hence it is clear that the dynamic pivot mechanism must account for this. For this reason, we define the dynamic marginal contributions
Suppose that the transfers in the model are defined as follows:
Bergemann & Välimäki (2010) 
and
Substituting into equation (1), one can solve
The last inequality follows from the assumption that
Consider next the case where
Since d * t = 1, it is easy to see that
For the next period,
Since the payments are non-negative for all players at all realization of the x i t , this calculation shows that the dynamic pivot mechanism generates a surplus.
Discussion
Budget Balance The dynamic pivot mechanism constructed is ex post incentive compatible, individually rational and results in an ex post budget surplus. In order to balance the budget, the transfers could be modified to bring the transfers to the level of the associated expected externality mechanism. This would nevertheless come at a cost. In the dynamic pivot mechanism, the committee members get as their payoff their marginal contribution. In the modified balanced budget mechanism, this would no longer be true. Hence there could be a potential trade-off between budget balance and correct incentives to pay private participation costs in the committee.
Correlated Committee Members
Since the dynamic pivot mechanism satisfies ex post incentive constraints, the same construction remains valid if the x i t are correlated across i. The only adjustment needed to cover this case is to note that the distribution G N (z n ) is no longer a convolution of the marginal distributions.
Learning the Payoff Distributions
The dynamic pivot mechanism can be modified to cover situations where the x i t are correlated across t.. An example of this would be models where each committee member draws payoffs from a conditionally i.i.d. draws from independent distributions F ( · : θ i ) and where the they learn in a Bayesian fashion about the θ i . The main difference in this setting would be that the optimal decisions now depend in a nontrivial manner on the histories.
Interdependent Values
Sometimes it is natural to think that the committee members have independent payoff relevant signals y i t on the candidates. To satisfy the appropriate monotonicity requirements, it must be assumed that the signal of member i has a larger impact on i ′ s payoff than on the payoffs of the other committee members. For example, we could have:
In this case, we could construct a dynamic version of the generalized VCG mechanism to implement the efficient decision rule based on the reported signals y i t . The main difference compared to the dynamic pivot mechanism would be in the calculation of the transfers. In the generalized VCG mechanism, the transfer of a pivotal player i that blocks an otherwise acceptable candidate is calculated based on the societal payoffs from the highest y i t that overturns the decision of the other members. Similarly the transfer of the pivotal player that forces the acceptance of an otherwise rejected candidate would be computed based on the lowest signal overturning the decision.
It should perhaps be noted that even in the pure common values setting where γ = 1, voting games perform quite badly whereas the generalized VCG mechanism implements the efficient allocation without requiring transfers.
More Complicated Committee Decisions
The dynamic pivot mechanism can be computed for committee decisions when multiple candidates must be selected. The insights gained from the simplest model give some suggestions for further work along this dimension even in cases where transfers are ruled out. If the committee must select two candidates from a sequence of potential candidates, an optimal decision rule can discipline those committee members that block the appointment of the current candidate by putting less weight on their reports when deciding on future candidates. With two candidates, the member that insists on getting her favorite candidate chosen for the first slot can be made to pay an implicit price by discounting her opinions when filling the second slot.
